Polymarket Admin Timelock
Who controls the timelock at 0x47EbFAC…629C, how proposals move through it, and the full on-chain history.
Overview
The contract at 0x47EbFAC3353314C788B96CDCbf41daadfE03629C on Polygon is a Solady Timelock (ERC-7821 batch executor combined with EnumerableRoles). It has no owner() — calling that selector reverts with FnSelectorNotRecognized(). Control flows entirely through four roles whose holders are recorded in on-chain storage.
Every payload that touches state must first be queued by a proposer, wait out a 12 hours mandatory delay, and then be executed by an executor. The delay itself can only be changed by the timelock calling setMinDelay on itself — i.e. the change must be queued and executed through the same path.
On-chain state verified at block 86,831,308 (2026-05-13).
Effective owner
A single address holds all four roles: 0x3dcE0a29139A851Da1dFCa56Af8e8a6440b4D952. That address is itself a Gnosis Safe v1.3.0 proxy — its bytecode is the canonical Safe proxy (172 bytes) and storage slot 0 points to the L2 singleton at 0x3E5c63644E683549055b9Be8653de26E0B4CD36E.
The Safe is configured as 3-of-6 with no modules enabled. So the practical owner of the timelock is "any 3 of these 6 signers":
| Signer | Note |
|---|---|
| 0xdCCd5D77a0d15ba3c6A5904869a266181A8f3a33 | — |
| 0x687c423646a4fAe6561908cFC28265f73f95B32F | — |
| 0xdBa96793A909415b0748F48626Cf207B7E1a887F | — |
| 0xd4848eFD79bD87B54f499bD087810E9F6Dab9FF1 | — |
| 0x80AbC332FD22e06B74eA1e248FD3D60fb94a855A | — |
| 0x00447A08bf275b7FB3D5d832387a54Be1090d281 | Also seen as a direct caller submitting a Safe execution. |
The deployer EOA 0xcA71EA69c54c163D17beB90BeB8D001E1Eb538A1 initialized the timelock once at deployment and holds no roles afterward. It cannot grant, propose, execute, or cancel anything on this contract.
Roles
The Solady EnumerableRoles mixin stores role membership in a hash-mapped enumerable set. Roles are plain uint256 identifiers — no bitmask — and the timelock caps them via MAX_ROLE() = 3. Granting any role above 3 reverts with InvalidRole().
| ID | Name | Powers |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | ADMIN_ROLE | Grants or revokes any role without going through the timelock delay. Cannot itself propose, execute, or cancel. |
| 1 | PROPOSER_ROLE | Queues an execution payload subject to the minimum delay. Submitting a proposal does not run any calls. |
| 2 | EXECUTOR_ROLE | Runs a queued proposal after its ready timestamp. Re-checks the ready state after the inner calls to guard against reentrancy. |
| 3 | CANCELLER_ROLE | Drops a queued proposal before it is executed. Has no effect on completed proposals. |
Every role grant or revoke emits RoleSet(holder, role, active). Public reads: hasRole, roleHolders, roleHolderCount, roleHolderAt.
Authorization rules
The timelock overrides _authorizeSetRole: only the contract itself or an ADMIN can change role membership. Because the only ADMIN is the Safe, every role change must either originate from a Safe-signed proposal that runs through the delay, or from a Safe-signed direct call to setRole (ADMIN bypasses the delay).
setMinDelay is stricter: the only authorized caller is address(this), so the delay can never be shortened without first queuing the change for at least the current delay.
Proposal lifecycle
A proposal is keyed by id = keccak256(abi.encode(mode, keccak256(executionData))). Storage packs done in bit 0 and the ready timestamp in bits 1..255 — so a single non-zero word encodes the entire state machine.
- Unset — slot is zero. A proposer calls
propose(mode, executionData, delay)withdelay ≥ minDelay. State moves to Waiting, ready atblock.timestamp + delay. - Waiting — the proposal exists but its ready timestamp has not passed. A canceller may call
cancel(id)to clear the slot. - Ready — current time is at or past the ready timestamp. An executor calls
execute(mode, executionData). After the inner calls return, the slot is rechecked (reentrancy guard) and the done bit is set. - Done — the proposal cannot be re-executed; its id is permanent.
Execution data follows ERC-7579: an array of (to, value, data) calls plus optional opData carrying a predecessor id and an optional salt. If a predecessor is set, the executor must run only after that predecessor is done; otherwise it reverts with TimelockUnexecutedPredecessor.
How a change actually ships
Because the Safe is the only role holder, every privileged call to the timelock is a Safe transaction. End-to-end:
- A signer drafts a Safe transaction whose payload is
timelock.propose(mode, executionData, delay). - 3 of 6 signers approve. Anyone can then submit
execTransaction(relayer or signer) — the on-chain signature check is what matters. - The timelock emits
Proposed(id, mode, executionData, readyTimestamp). The community has 12 hours to react. - After the delay, the Safe signs a second transaction calling
execute(mode, executionData). The timelock fans out the batch and emitsExecuted(id, mode, executionData).
At any point before execution, the Safe can sign a cancel(id) instead and zero out the slot.
On-chain history
Full event log emitted by the timelock since deployment, in order:
| Block | Tx | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| 84,902,365 | 0x1d97f7de…6f84e5 | initialize(): MinDelaySet(43200s) and all four roles granted to the Safe. One-shot, called directly by the deployer EOA. |
| 85,668,245 | 0x524615f0…7885c4 | Proposed 0x70f2…d2d9. |
| 85,715,351 | 0x790db09c…ef8538 | Executed 0x70f2…d2d9 (after the 12-hour delay). |
| 86,154,767 | 0x3d2862af…e10933 | Proposed 0x876c…a357 and 0x90bf…a75e in one batch. |
| 86,180,561 | 0x60afd061…b0e42b | Executed both proposals from the previous batch. No Cancelled events to date. |
No Cancelled events have ever fired, and the minimum delay has not been changed since initialization.
Threat model in plain terms
- A single compromised signer is not enough. Any privileged action requires 3 independent Safe signatures.
- Even 3 signers cannot move funds instantly. They can only queue a payload; the 12 hours delay gives counterparties time to detect a malicious proposal and exit.
- Cancellation is symmetric. Because the Safe also holds CANCELLER_ROLE, the same 3-of-6 signers can also drop a queued proposal — useful if a key gets compromised mid-cycle.
- The delay can shrink, but slowly.
setMinDelaymust run through the timelock, so reducing the delay to zero still costs one full 12 hours window of warning. - Initialization is one-shot.
initializereverts on the second call withTimelockAlreadyInitialized(); the deployer EOA cannot reset role assignments.